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INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND HOSTILE PROPAGANDA BY PRIVATE
PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES
MANUEL R.

GARCIA-MORAt

It is a fairly well established legal proposition that subversive activities or revolutionary propaganda stemming from official sources is an
international delinquency and, thus, redressable under international law.1
However, an area of controversy is entered when dealing with revolutionary activities or hostile propaganda proceeding from private individuals. The preliminary problem thus arises of adequately imposing
international responsibility on the state for hostile acts committed by private persons under the protection of its territorial sovereignty and directed against the peace and security of a foreign state.' While it is
generally agreed that revolutionary acts of private persons are liable to
be punished by the criminal law of the state against which they are directed under the so-called protective jurisdiction principle,3 international
law becomes equally involved when the menaced state is unable to punish
such activities thereby frustrating its possibilities of maintaining internal
peace. 4 It is the purpose of this article to explore the position of international law on this subject.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Private revolutionary activities against foreign states present the
initial and vital questions concerning the competence of international law
to deal with them and the existence of a duty of prevention on the part of
t Professor of Law, University of Detroit; Fulbright Visiting Professor of Lav at
the Univcrsity of San Marcos, Lima, Peru, 1959-60. This article represents another
facet of the general problem of criminal jurisdiction of the state, previously discussed in
Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over Fugitives Brought From a Foreign
Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L. J. 427 (1957).

1. RousSEAu, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 374 (1953).

2. There is in this connection a doctrinal confusion. Some publicists speak of
original and vicarious responsibility, the former describing the responsibility of the state

for acts of its government, while the latter includes responsibility for private acts. See,
1 OPPENIHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955). Others speak of
direct and indirect responsibility of the state. See, MIELE, PRINCIPI Di DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 236 (1953) ; DUMAS, DE LA RESPONSIBILIT INTERNATIONALE DES RTATS 5764 (1930). Still others speak of primary and secondary liability. See, 2 McNAIR, INTERNATIONAL LAw OPINIoNs 288 (1956).

3. For a full discussion of this principle, see Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction
over Foreigners for Treason and Offenses Against the Safety of the State Committed

Upon Foreign Territory, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 567 (1958).
4. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign
States, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 105 (1928).
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the territorial state.' Though the rules of international law on this matter have not been considered as sufficiently precise to insure international
cooperation,' it may be quite possible to suggest a control of private revolutionary activities both by international law and by the law of each individual state.
As matters stood prior to the legal transformation following World
War II, the rules of customary international law not only failed to impose upon the territorial state the duty to prevent subversive activities on
the part of the individual against foreign states, but also denied to the
affected nation a corresponding right to redress.' More precisely, the international law position of this period seemed to indicate that the international responsibility of the state was not engaged in so far as private revolutionary activities were concerned.8 The right of the aggrieved community could scarcely exceed one of vigorous protest.9 The net result of
this legal position was a lack of a legal duty of the territorial state to enforce observance thereof upon citizens and aliens alike. International
law, therefore, did not itself make the toleration of private revolutionary
activities an international delinquency. What it did was to grant a liberty
to the wronged state to deal with offending individuals who came into
its jurisdiction. It thus became almost generally accepted that persons
threatening a state's political institutions from foreign territory were
amenable to the jurisdiction of the aggrieved state.'" In so doing, international law made available to the state the so-called protective ground
upon which to exercise jurisdiction."
The failure of international law to bring private hostile activities
against foreign states within its regulation can be broadly attributed to
three factors. The first is that, while the authority of international law
is generally conceded, in principle that authority has stopped short in
matters stemming from the exercise of territorial sovereignty inasmuch
as the latter is not only exclusive but is also a right protected by international law itself. It is, therefore, possible to argue, as the late Judge
5. "Territorial State" signifies in this connection the state within whose jurisdiction the hostile act was committed.

6. See in this connection the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of
December 10, 1934, in respect to the alleged terrorist activities of Yugoslav nationals in
Hungary. PUBLICATIONS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, C.L. 219, 1934.
7. Preuss, Internatioal Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda against Foreign

States, 28 Ami. J.

INT'L

L. 649 (1934).

8. 1 OPPENHEIm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 293.
9. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

10.
(1928).

LAW 243 (6th ed. 1915).
DE VABREs, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES Du DROIT PtNAL INTERNATIONAL

87

11. Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School.
Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 543 (1935).
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Anzilotti apparently did, 2 that in so far as territorial supremacy exists,
"international law presupposes the State" and, thus, the state cannot be
held accountable by international law unless the state should neglect its
duties specifically emanating from a treaty. 3 The central core of this
doctrine really proceeds from a conception of sovereignty singularly exempted from any legal regulation. 4 Second, hostile actions by private
individuals against foreign governments are usually classed as political
offenses for which the state has the competence to grant asylum under
international law." On this view, the states are naturally reluctant to
punish individuals for the commission of political offenses. This fact is
particularly heightened in a conflict of ideology where the asylum state
may not feel any special sympathy towards the political institutions of
the state of which the refugees are nationals and, thus, the suppression of
revolutionary propaganda coming from these sources may be viewed with
particular antipathy."
This argument on principle would still afford no
legal warrant for a state's failure to suppress revolutionary propaganda
by refugees, for, though there is no question about a nation's right to
harbor political refugees, it would seem that consistently with the obligations of friendship between states, such persons may not be permitted to
plot against the institutions of their native country.'" The third factor
can best be explained in terms of the dilemma posed by a democratic society in preventing subversive propaganda against foreign governments
while at the same time preserving its constitutional liberties.' 8 Even if
in practice this problem may be real, the obligations of the state on the
12.

1 ANZlLOTTI,

COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

51 (French transl. by Gidel,

1920).
13. Id. at 466, 467.
14.

Apparently, Judge De Visscher held similar views. See, DE VISSCHER, THEORY
AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-104 (Corbett's transl. 1957).
15. Cf. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT ch.

4 (1956).
16. In this regard, a bill was defeated in the British Parliament designed to punish
conspiracies formed in England and directed against foreign sovereigns. 2 MOoRE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

431 (1906).

17. Id. at 430. In fact, this is one obligation that the state granting asylum has to
fulfill.
18. Smith, Subversive Propaganda, the Past and the Present, 29 GEO. L.J. 809
(1940-1941). Upon complaint of the Mexican Government that publications appearing
in the United States incited anarchism against Mexico, the State Department answered
in part that "free speech and freedom of the press are two of the most sacred rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of this country; . . . they are absolutely inviolable
rights; and . . . although it may for a moment appear that such rights should be to a
greater or less extent curtailed, a continuous national growth and development of more
than a century and a quarter demonstrates beyond the possibility of a doubt that the
public intelligence necessary to a firm and permanent stability and progress requires that
such rights shall remain inviolate." Note of Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican
Ambassador De Zamacona, June 7, 1911, 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

142 (1941).
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international plane cannot be avoided by invoking difficulties of internal
constitutional order.10
It can be readily seen, therefore, that traditional juristic interest was
primarily concerned with preserving the rights involved in territorial
sovereignty and not at all with the function of international law or with
laying a foundation for international cooperation." The difficulty with
the problems arises from narrow and oversimplified interpretations which
have obscured the issue by formulating it exclusively in terms of territorial sovereignty and, in so doing, international law faithfully reflected
the absence of an international community of shared values and social
solidarity. In addition, the constructive role which can be played by the
development of international cooperation in this area has been in large
measure blocked by the extent to which political considerations have been
permitted to hold the center of the scene. Parallel with all this, writers
on the subject were accustomed to classify states into the categories of
"liberal" or "reactionary" depending upon whether or not their internal
legislation provided for the punishment of revolutionary activities against
foreign states.2 As late as 1928, Judge Lauterpacht regarded the Russian Penal Code of 1903 as "the most reactionary of all" because it
punished all attempts, conspiracies and preparations within Russian territory designed to overthrow a foreign government. 2 Such a statement
may have been largely motivated by the belief that no democratic government could safely extend protection to political systems at variance with
the democratic ideology. Since international law until recently was essentially European and the European countries largely subscribed to the
democratic ideology, it was relatively simple to conclude that international law imposed no obligation whatsoever to protect foreign states
whose political ideology was particularly distasteful. This argument,
however, has lost all its useful meaning today when some eighty states of
diverse political systems have come to play a vital role in the World Community process thus transforming the exclusive European nature of inter19. In this connection, the Permanent Court of International Justice said: "While
on the one hand, according to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as
against another State, on the provisions of the latter's constitution, but only on international law and international obligations duly accepted, on the other hand and conversely, a State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view
to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force."
Advisory Opinion on Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, P. C. I. J., Ser. A/B,

No. 44 at 24 (1932).
20. Alvarez, The Reconstruction and Codification of International Law, 1

L.Q. 469, 471 (1947).

INT'L

21. Thus, Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 4, at 117; Wright, The Crime of WarMongering, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 128, 134 (1948).
22. Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 4, at 117.
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national law into a world wide system.23 The peaceful coexistence of
these states in the World Community would seem to suggest that their
governments be secured against revolutionary activities and hostile propaganda coming from other jurisdictions.
It can of course be argued that to accept the above analysis would
amount to asserting that the international community may become a
system of mutual assistance thus helping to perpetuate tyrannical governments.2" Though there may be substance in this view, it should be recalled that because of the concentration of power in the modern state
popular revolutions are doomed to failure25 and that, therefore, the interest of the World Society in the maintenance of peace is greater than
the well intentioned desires of sporadic groups of individuals to. overthrow an existing totalitarian government. It certainly runs counter to
justice to plunge the World Society into a world conflagration because of
the toleration of private activities designed to overthrow the government
of another state. Peace is the first duty of the World Society that every
state must promote and cultivate. This is an overriding moral obligation.
Even from the standpoint of territorial sovereignty, it must be recognized as axiomatic that the rights inherent in this concept must be exercised in a manner consistent with the equally protected rights of other
nations. In this connection, there can be no doubt that a state has a
right to independence and to the peaceful enjoyment of its institutions
and that this is a right protected by international law. But it so happens that this right is put in danger by revolutionary acts stemming from
private individuals under the protection of another country's sovereignty.
It is, therefore, a reasonable expectation of every state that the territorial sovereignty of another should not be used in a manner which seriously threatens the former's safety and independence.26 It would indeed
be highly inconsistent with the independence of states if the citizens of
one state were allowed to plot against the institutions of a friendly nation. The force of this argument reveals itself with all its cogency when
considering that if a state does not suppress revolutionary actions and
subversive propaganda taking place within its jurisdiction, the customary
23.
24.

JENKS, THE COmmON LAW OF MANKIND

ch. 2 (1958).

JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 184-87 (1948).
25. Cf. MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

59 (1951).
26. Thus, Article 2 (6) of the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind prepared by the International Law Commission of the United Nations in its third session in 1951, makes an offense against the peace and security of
mankind "The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist
activities in another State, or the toleration by the authority of a State of organized
activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State." For text, see Doc.
A/CN.4/48, July 30, 1951, and 45 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 103, 128 (1951).

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
right of intervention on the part of the menaced government is readily
2

conceded.

7

The foregoing observations, though usually overlooked, are in the
present view the most satisfactory ones, for a World Society of States,
where the rights of sovereignty and the equality of states are postulates
of the law, would of necessity imply a mutual obligation to supppress
revolutionary acts directed against a friendly foreign nation.2" The real
issue is, therefore, whether a state values the interest of the World Society in peaceful coexistence sufficiently to impose upon itself the obligation to prevent and and punish revolutionary activity which endangers
good relations between nations. 9 Indeed, Vattel asserted such an obligation derived from a mutual duty to promote justice between nations
in the following terms:
The Nation, or the sovereign, must not allow its citizens
to injure the subjects of another State, much less to offend that
State itself; and this not only because no sovereign should permit those under his rule to violate the precepts of the natural
law, which forbids such acts, but also because Nations should
mutually respect one another and avoid any offense, injury,
or wrong; in a word, anything which might be hurtful to others.
If a sovereign who has the power to see that his subjects act in
a just manner permits them to injure a foreign nation, either
the State itself or its citizens, he does no less a wrong to that
nation than if he injured it himself. Finally, the very safety of
the State and of society at large demands this care on the part
of every sovereign."0
It would seem, therefore, that in a World Society deeply concerned
with order and justice, the state ought to be bound to prevent anything
which constitutes a danger to foreign nations. This is not to imply that
the state has the duty to protect actively the constitution of a foreign
government, however distasteful that government may be to its own citizens.3" What it does imply is a duty of prevention, that is, of preventing injurious acts against foreign governments regardless of whether

Cf.

27.
THOMAS AND THOAAS, NON-INTERVENTION:
THE AMERICAS 274 (1956).

T3HE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN

28. Kuhn, The Complaint of Yugoslavia Against Hungary With Reference to the
Assassination of King Alexander, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 87, 89 (1935).
29. Lord Jowitt, The Value of International Law in Establishing Cooperation

Anzong Nations, 1 INT'L L.Q. 295 (1947).
30. VATTEL, DROIT DES GENS bk II, ch. VI, § 72 (Fenwick's transl. 1916).
31. Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 4, at 129.
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such acts proceed from official sources or from private individuals.3 2
The international responsibility of the state is in either case engaged. If
friendly relations between nations be to the international common good,
then it is of the essence that the international society constitute a cohesive
and integrated whole by insisting upon a system of rights and mutual
obligations, instead of being divided into a multiplicity of societies with
diverse loyalties and contrasting sentiments, shattering the conception of
a community of interests.
Looking comprehensively at the manner in which the states fulfill
their obligations in this area, three criteria immediately emerge, which
suggest the classification of the states into three clearly defined categories. One group, which includes the United States and Great Britain,
restricts the duty to prevent subversive acts to obligations arising under
the laws of neutrality. The other group, which includes Continental
European and South American countries, bases the duty of prevention
on the security of the state by avoiding complications with foreign nations. And, finally, the third group, which includes recent legislation
from the Soviet Union and other Iron Curtain-countries, considers subversive acts and propaganda against foreign states as an offense against
the peace and security of mankind. The application of these principles
will be discussed in dealing with the legislation and case law of the
various countries.

II. THE

PRINCIPLE OF NEUTRALITY

(1) The Law of the United States
The law of the United States in respect to subversive acts planned
or being committed against a foreign state by private individuals is exclusively confined to obligations resulting from the laws of neutrality
relating to an international or a civil war. It is not surprising, therefore,
that political plots against foreign nations are made punishable in the
United States only when such acts adopt the form of a military or naval
expedition or enterprise against a state with which the United States is
on friendly terms. 4 The American position in this regard leaves no
room for doubt. Thus, in 1885 when the British Government inquired
whether participating in the Irish National League, an organization to
promote revolutionary movements in Ireland, was an offense against the
32. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 126 (1952).
33. As to private individuals, it is said that this creates an indirect responsibility
on the part of the state. For these views, see note 2 supra.
34. Garcia-Mora, InternationalLaw and The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions,
27 FORDEDAm L. REv. 309 (1958).
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sedition statutes of the United States, the State Department succinctly
answered that "treason and sedition made punishable under those statutes
are treason and sedition against the United States, and they do not make
Similarly,
punishable treason and sedition against foreign sovereigns."
in 1907 the Mexican Government protested that revolutionary plots were
being fomented in the United States for the purpose of launching attacks
in Mexican territory. The Attorney General, while admitting that there
had been publications in this country, by citizens of Mexico residing in
the United States, of newspapers and circulars directed against the administration of President Diaz and intended to incite uprisings and foment revolutionary movements in Mexico, declined to act on the ground
that there was not yet any evidence that the persons involved had violated the neutrality laws of the United States by initiating a military expedition to be carried on from the United States against Mexico."6 In a
communication of July 31, 1885, addressed to the Spanish minister, relating to revolutionary activities of the supporters of the Cuban insurrection, the State Department expressed similar views in an even more
definite form: "It [the United States] does not assume to visit with
penalty conduct, which if committed within a foreign jurisdiction, might
be punished therein."3 " Finally, President Cleveland's fourth message
to Congress, in referring to the revolutionary activities of Cubans in the
United States, deplored that "the spirit of our institutions and the tenor
of our laws do not permit [revolutionary activities] to be made the subject of criminal prosecution." 3
The body of evidence thus far gathered would seem to make it clear
that in American law three conditions must exist in order to convert an
otherwise unpunishable revolutionary act into a criminal offense. First,
the purpose of the alleged offense must be an attack or invasion against
a foreign country; second, it must proceed from the territory of the
United States; and, finally, it must take the form of a military or naval
force.3" In the absence of these conditions, the United States is reluctant to extend the restrictions placed upon its residents and declines to
35. See Note from Secretary of State Bayard to the British Representative, Mr.
Harris, April 2, 1885, 2 MooRE, op. cit. .rupra note 16, at 431-32.
36. Note of Ambassador Creel to Secretary of State Root, March 4, 1907, 2
HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 337-38. It should be added that subsequently the
persons involved were convicted for violations of the neutrality statutes when they
pleaded guilty to the charge of beginning and setting on foot a military expedition
against Mexico. Id. at 338-39.
37. Note of Secretary of State Bayard to Minister Valera, July 31, 1885, U.S.
FOREIGN REL. 1885 at 776 (1886).

38. U.S. FOREIGN REL. 1896 at -xi (1897).
39. United States v. Tauscher, 233 Fed. 597, 599-600 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1916).
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punish revolutionary activities confined to incitement to revolt or to fomenting uprisings in a foreign state.4"
The foregoing point is also applicable to libel and seditious publications against foreign governments." For in so far as these are private
publications, governmental action in this area is likely to give rise to difficulties involving the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and
of the press.4 Concurrently with this is the fact that in the United States
there is no federal common law of crimes and, thus, federal crimes must
be established by statute.43 Inasmuch as no federal statute exists providing punishment for the defamation of foreign governments, a criminal prosecution in such cases would only be cognizable in the courts of
the states.44 Most of these principles are well illustrated in the communications of the State Department answering complaints of foreign governments for libelous propaganda published in newspapers in the United
States. On such occasions, the State Department, in explaining the inability of the United States to act, has invariably referred to freedom of
speech and of the press which is, "under the Constitution of the United
States, absolutely assured to those dwelling within its jurisdiction,""
while at the same time calling to the attention of the foreign government
in question that an action against the publisher could possibly be maintained in the proper state court.46
It is to be immediately observed that such assertions of the State
Department can scarcely meet the international obligations of the United
States to afford foreign governments adequate protection against revolutionary propaganda and libelous publications.4 7 As propositions of law,
their validity is dubious. It certainly is no argument to assert that a
state is not bound to accede to requests from foreign nations which are
40. See note 36 supra.
41. Dickinson, The Defamation of Foreign Governments, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 840
(1928), dealing specifically with the alleged defamation of the Mexican Government by
the Hearst newspapers in 1927.
42. See the note of Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican Ambassador De
Zamacona, June 7, 1911, 2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 142.
43. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1813). See also
for discussion, Maschzisker, Common Law and Our Federal Jurisprudence,74 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 109, 270, 367 (1925-1926).
44. 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 432. It seems, however, that the laws of the
United States make a penal offense the secret transportation of explosives from the
United States to any foreign country. Id. at 431. See also the case Daeche v. United
States, 250 Fed. 566 (2d Cir. 1918), involving the conviction of a person for attempting
to blow up ships leaving the port of New York loaded with munitions for the Allied
Powers in World War I.
45. Note of Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican Ambassador De Zamacona,
June 7, 1911, 2 HACKWORTr, op. cit. supra note 18, at 142.
46. Note of Secretary of State Knox to the Mexican Charg6 d'Affaires, February
15, 1911, 2 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 18, at 142.
47. Dickinson, supra note 41, at 843.
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incompatible with its laws and constitution." For not only can the federal government act under the constitutional power of Congress "To define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations,"49 but it is

common learning that statutes in the United States have imposed criminal liability for seditious utterances and publications injurious to public
morals and such statutes have been upheld by the courts against attacks
grounded upon freedom of speech and of the press." The operation of
this type of legislation, however, has been carefully circumscribed, for
the courts have explicitly required that it must meet the "clear and present danger" rule, which essentially means that before an utterance can be
penalized by the government it must ordinarily have occurred "in such
circumstances" or have been of "such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger" that it would bring about "substantive evils" within the
power of the government to prevent. 1 Thus viewed, it is difficult to see
why legislation penalizing revolutionary activities and hostile propaganda
against foreign governments could not be applied within the same limits. 2
It must be added that it is most questionable on grounds of public policy
whether the United States can remain totally passive in the presence of
activities calculated to create hostile feelings in foreign states and, more
specifically, to cause a breach of peace between nations. 3 This last argument commends itself most cogently in practice, for it is indissolubly
linked with the respect which nations owe each other at all times. 4
48. Cf. Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 123. Professor Fenwick dismisses this whole
area by simply saying that "The protection given to freedom of speech in the constitutions of democratic States has made it difficult to restrain the acts of private individuals." FENWIcK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (3d ed. 1948).
49. U.S. CON¢ST. art. I, § 8.
50. See in this connection, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), affirming a conviction under the Federal Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217 (1917), for causing or
attempting to cause insubordination in the military forces of the United States by sending to men, who had been newly drafted into the army, pamphlets denouncing conscription and urging them to assert their rights in opposition to the draft. Also Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), affirming a number of convictions for violation of
§ 2 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), for advocating, advising and teaching
the desirability of overthrowing the government by force. And, finally, Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), dealing with a similar sedition law of New York.

51. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
52. Wright, supra note 21, at 134.
53. It should be observed that when the First Committee of the General Assembly
discussed measures to be taken against propaganda and the inciters of a new war, the
majority of the delegates felt that defamation of leaders of foreign governments was a
form of war propaganda. See in particular the opinion of the Australian Delegate,
Dr. Evatt. General Assembly, 2d Session, First Committee, 79th Meeting, 184-88 (1947).
54. This has been considered by some publicists as the basis of international law.
See, 1 0LIVART, EL DERncHo INTERNACIONAL PuRLico EN Los ULTIMOS VEINTICINCO
ANos 537 (1927) and Lord Jowitt, supra note 29, at 295.
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(2) The Law of Great Britain
Like its American counterpart, the law of Great Britain has been
predominantly based on the principle of neutrality and, therefore, does
not punish revolutionary plots and treasonable acts against foreign states
unless they form part of a military or naval expedition.55 But despite
this substantial similarity between the two laws, significant differences
may nevertheless be observed.
First, when revolutionary activities assume the character of publications against the person of a foreign sovereign the English law treats
them as criminal libel and punishable as such. The raison d'&re of this
rule is the well founded apprehension that if such hostile publications are
permitted to go unpunished, peaceful relations with foreign nations may
thereby be disturbed. 6 Thus, when in 1762 the King of Denmark complained of a scandalous and indecent publication contained in the London
.Chronicle, the Attorney-General emphatically stated:
[S]candalous and injurious reflections published in derogation of the Honour and Dignity of Foreign States and
Princes in Amity with his Majesty may be punished criminally
by Information or Indictment as libel, because such Reflections
tend to interrupt the Harmony and Confidence which subsists
between the Crown of Great Britain and Its Allies. .... "
The English courts have been similarly strict in dealing with cases
of defamation of a foreign sovereign. In this connection, in King v.
Vint,5 8 involving a libelous publication against the Emperor of Russia,
the Lord Chief Justice declared:
I can only say, that if one were so to offend another in
private life in this country, it might be made the subject of an
action; and when these papers went to Russia and held up this
great sovereign as being a tyrant and ridiculous over Europe, it
might tend to his calling for satisfaction as for a national affront, if it passed unreprobated by our government and in our
courts of justice."
0 involving a libel
In a somewhat similar vein, in King v. Peltier,"

55. Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vie. ch. 90.
56.

1 OPPENHEim, op. cit. supra note 2, at 283 n. 1.

57. Cited by MeNair, Aspects of State Sovereignty, 26 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1949 at
6, 27 (n.d.).
58. 27 Howell's State Trials 627 (1799), per Lord Kenyon, C.J.

59. Id. at 641.
60. 28 Howell's State Trials 529 (1803), per Lord Ellenborough, C. J.
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against Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul, the court unmistakably
laid down as a proposition of law that "any publication which tends to
degrade, revile, and defame persons in considerable situations of power
and dignity in foreign countries may be taken to be and treated as a libel,
and particularly where it has a tendency to interrupt the pacific relations
between the two countries."'"
It seems likely, however, that the liberal conceptions of freedom of
the press and of expression of opinion which obtained in the twentieth
century have somewhat limited the above holdings to the special circumstances of their origin. 2 This proposition is instructively illustrated by
63
the more recent case of King v. Antonelli & Barberi,
involving a libel
in the form of a pamphlet, attempting to justify the crimes of assassination and murder, and to incite persons to commit those crimes upon the
sovereigns and rulers of Europe. The significance of this decision lies
in the fact that, contrary to previous rulings, the court held that "a document published in this country, which is calculated to disturb the government of some foreign country, is not a seditious libel, nor punishable as
a libel at all.", 4
Secondly, incitement to assassinate the head of a foreign government is also rigorously punishable under English law. Thus, the Act of
1861 dealing with Offenses Against the Person provides in its pertinent
provision:
All persons who shall conspire, confederate, and agree to
murder any person, whether he be a subject of Her Majesty or
not, and whether he be within the Queen's dominions or not,
and whosoever shall solicit, encourage, persuade or endeavour
to persuade, or shall propose to any person, to murder any
other person, whether he be a subject of Her Majesty or not,
and whether he be within the Queen's dominions or not, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor ... "
The foregoing provision has occasionally come before the courts.
The leading case in this connection is Regina v. Most,66 involving the publication and circulation of an article, written in German in a newspaper
in that language in London, exulting in the murder of the Emperor of
61. Id. at 617. See also King v. Lord George Gordon, 22 Howell's State Trials
175 (1787), involving a libel against the Queen of France and the French Ambassador.
62. English writers seem to agree on this point. See, 1 MCNAIR, INTERNATIONAL
LAW OPINIONS 10-14 (1956) and Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 114-15.
63. 70 J.P. 4 (1905), 14 The English and Empire Digest 99 (1956).

64. Ibid.
65. Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861 § 4, 24 & 25 Vic. ch. 100.
66. [1881] 7 Q.B. 244.
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Russia and commending it as an example to revolutionists throughout the
world. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the court held that the
publication and circulation of a newspaper article might be an encouragement to persuade to murder, within the statute, although not addressed
to any person in particular.6" A similar principle was applied in King v.
Antonelli & Barberi previously cited.6" There the court, in deciding upon the sufficiency of the indictment in regard to the contention that no
prospective victim of the act had been specifically mentioned, held that
"sovereigns of Europe" specified a sufficiently definite class and, therefore, that the counts of the indictment were good. It should be added
that the Act is clearly applicable to subjects and aliens alike,"0 within and
without the realm,7" as long as there exists a permanent or temporary
allegiance to the Crown.
It is of some interest to note that the Canadian Criminal Code follows closely the principles of the English law. Its pertinent provision
states that "Everyone is guilty of an indictable offense and liable to one
year's imprisonment who, without lawful justification, publishes any libel
tending to degrade, revile or expose to hatred and contempt in the estimation of the people of any foreign state, any prince or person exercising
sovereign authority over such state."'" It is quite obvious that this provision is calculated to punish libels against foreign governments and not
revolutionary acts of a treasonable character. As to the latter, the
Canadian law seems to follow the traditional Anglo-American law in that
such acts must be a part of a military or naval expedition.72
III.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY

Unlike Anglo-American law, the legislation of a number of states
has regarded private revolutionary acts as well as hostile publications
against foreign states as criminal offenses. The underlying motive be67. See also the Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown in respect to a complaint of the Turkish Ambassador relating to an alleged incitement to assassinate the
Sultan. The Opinion is printed in McNair, Aspects of State Sovereignty, 26 BRIT. YB.
INT'L L. 1949 at 28-29 (ad.).
68. See note 63 supra. It is significant that the same principle was applied in King
v. Bowman, 76 J.P. 271 (1912), 15 The English and Empire Digest 781 (1957), dealing
with an incitement to mutiny. The Court held that "an indictment framed under the
Incitement to Mutiny Act, 1797 (c.70), need not specify any particular person or persons serving in His Majesty's forces by sea or land who have been approached by accused in contravention of the above Act."
69. Regina v. Sandoval, 56 L.T.R. (n.s.) 526 (Q.B. 1887), per J. Willis.
70. Regina v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q.B. 425, per Lord Russell, C.J.
71. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 36, § 135 (1927).
72. See, Canadian Act Respecting Foreign Enlistment, April 10, 1937, Art. 10, 1
DEAK AND JESSUP, A COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES OF

VARIoUS COUNTRIES 236, 239 (1939).
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hind this type of legislation appears to be a firm desire to avoid complications with foreign governments rather than a recognition of an international obligation towards foreign states. The security of the legislating state is therefore of paramount significance, though occasionally
some legislative provisions make reference to the maintenance of friendly
relations between states.
In line with the foregoing considerations, the French Penal Code
dearly provides that a person shall be liable to punishment for "any hostile act which exposes the State to a declaration of war, or the State or a
French citizen to reprisals.""3 It seems generally agreed that this provision is only designed to prevent the commission of revolutionary and
subversive acts within French territory. However, the Act Concerning
the Freedom of the Press of July 29, 1881," 4 punishes hostile utterances
against heads of foreign states and foreign diplomatic agents. More
specifically, Article 36 of this law punishes "Insults uttered publicly
against the Heads of Foreign States, Heads of Foreign Governments
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Foreign Governments." Similarly,
Article 37 punishes "Insults uttered publicly against Ambassadors and
Plenipotentiary Ministers, Envoys, Chargi d'Affaires or other diplomatic
agents accredited to the Government of the Republic." 5
The Italian law on the subject seems to apply exclusively to revolutionary acts and there seems to be no specific provision dealing with hostile propaganda against foreign governments. 6 Thus, the pertinent provision of the Italian Penal Code stipulates that "any person shall be liable
to punishment who by enlistment or other hostile acts unauthorized by
the government exposes the State to the danger of war or reprisals, or,
in general, who disturbs the friendly relations between the Italian Government and a foreign State."7 7 The corresponding provision of the
Swiss Penal Code establishes that "If a person attempts, from Swiss
73. CODE PENAL arts.

84 and 84. For text, see

1 DEAK AND JESSUP, op.

cit. supra

note 72, at 583.
74. For text of this Act, see 2 U.N. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A

COMPILATION

30, 34 (1950).

75. These two provisions were included in articles 92 and 93 of the Act Regulating
the Press, of June 30, 1947. For text, see Id. at 44, 45. Though the articles are substantially the same, Article 92 merely increases the fine to 10,000 to 5,000,000 francs instead of the former 1,000 to 1,000,000 francs in regard to insults against heads of
foreign states.
76. This appears from the reply which the Italian Government gave the United
Nations Secretariat, Department of Social Affairs, as found in 1 U.N. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPILATION 10-11 (1950).

In any event, the Act of February 8, 1948,
establishing Provisions Concerning the Press, does not have any provision dealing with
hostile propaganda against foreign states. For this law, see 2 U.N. FREEDOM OF INFORmATION: A COMPILATION 67-69 (1950) .

77. Italy, Penal Code, art. 113, as quoted in Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 119.
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territory, to disturb the political order of a foreign State by violence, he
shall be liable to imprisonment." 8 But the Code is not exclusively confined to revolutionary activities, for another of its provisions punishes
hostile propaganda in the following terms: "If a person publicly insults
a foreign State in the person of its Head, its diplomatic representative or
its Government, he shall be liable to imprisonment or a fine."7'
The
interpretation of this last provision clearly indicates that attacks in the
press are included."0 It should be observed, however, that prosecution
under these two articles can only be undertaken at the request of a foreign
government and only if reciprocity is assured. 8
In addition to the above provisions, the laws of a small number of
states punish libelous publications by individuals against foreign states.
Thus, the Iranian Act of February, 1908, Concerning the Press,8 2 makes
a penal offense "Attacks against the Sovereigns of Friendly States,"83 as
well as casting "slurs on the honor of foreign officials and members of
foreign political assemblies." 84 In like manner, the Swedish Constitutional Act of March 23, 1949, Relating to the Freedom of the Press, "
prohibits utterances which are an "affront to the flag or shield of a
foreign Power or to any other symbol of its sovereignty or libel or other
defamatory act against the head or representative of a foreign Power here
in the Kingdom."" Apparently, similar legislation is presently found
in India," Lebanon,

88

and Norway.

Being much troubled by internal revolutions, the Central and South
American countries have similarly enacted legislation punishing revolutionary activities emanating from their jurisdiction. Thus, the Penal
Code of Peru makes it an offense to violate the territorial sovereignty of
78. Switzerland, Penal Code, December 21, 1937, as amended, art. 299.
79. Art. 296.
80. See the reply of the Swiss government to inquiry from the United Nations
Secretariat, Department of Social Affairs, 1 U.N. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPILATION 214-15 (1950).
81. Switzerland, Penal Code, December 21, 1937, as amended, art. 302. Though
Switzerland is traditionally a land of refuge for the politically persecuted, hospitality is
granted under the condition that refugees restrain from hostile acts against their own
government. There have been many instances of deportation of political refugees for
failure to abide by this condition. See, DuMAS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 59.
82. For text, see 2 U.N. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPILATION 60, 63 (1950).
83. Art. 40.
84. Art. 41.
85. For text, see 2 U.N. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPILATION 69, 74.
86. Art. 4. These are listed among the Offenses Against Freedom of the Press
in Chapter 7 of the Act.
87. India, Foreign Relations Act, 1932, as reported in 1 U.N. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A COMPILATION 212 (1950).
88. Lebanon Government Decree of May 6 (1924), id. at 212.
89. Norway, Penal Code of May 22, c. 23 (1902), id. at 213.
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a foreign state as well as the commission of acts designed to alter by
force the political order of other states."0 Also the Penal Code of
Panama punishes any one who within Panamanian territory commits an
offense against the head of a foreign state, and adds that in such cases
prosecution is to be had at the request of the foreign government in
question. 0" Similarly, the Penal Code of the Dominican Republic not
only makes it a criminal offense to libel and slander the head of a foreign
friendly nation, 2 but also punishes any hostile act disapproved by the
Government which exposes the Republic to a declaration of war.93 It is
of some interest to note in reference to these provisions that when in
1927 two journalists published libelous remarks against a deceased exPresident of the United States, the Dominican court interpreted them as
applying to the head of a friendly nation and not to a deceased person
who held the position when alive.94 More recently, the Federal Supreme
Court of Argentina denied habeas corpus to an Uruguayan citizen whose
internment had been asked by the Uruguayan Government because of his
seditious activities in Argentine territory to disturb the political order of
Uruguay."5 The Supreme Court relied upon the Treaty of International
Penal Law of Montevideo of January 23, 1889, which in guaranteeing
the right of asylum, imposed upon the asylum state the duty to prevent
"those taking asylum from carrying out on its territory acts which put in
danger the public peace of the nation against which they have offended."9 8
The foregoing recital of municipal codes and legislation is a commendable recognition that friendly relations between states is a value of
the World Society and that these relations may be impaired by revolutionary activities and hostile propaganda on the part of individuals. Admittedly, the protection afforded foreign governments is motivated by
considerations of security, thus being in reality incidental to the legislating nation's own interest." As a practical matter, however, the line between the protection of the state's security and that of foreign states is
not so very clear and in particular cases is fairly difficult to mark. It
may be further noted that in this type of legislation there is at least an
attempt to balance these interests so as to foster the development of re90. Peru, Penal Code, § 297 (1924).
91.
92.
93.
94.

Panama, Penal Code, art. 115 (1922).
Dominican Republic, Penal Code, arts. 367 and 369 (1927).
Arts. 84 and 85.
This case is anonymously reported in 2 U.N. FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION:

A

COMPILATION 191 (1950).

95. In re Barreta, Argentina, Federal Supreme Court, 1933-34 Annual Digest of
Public InternationalLaw Cases 259 (Lauterpacht ed. 1940).

96. Id. at 260.

97. Research in International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School.
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 552 (1935).
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ciprocal obligations along a course not wholly independent of the necessity for peaceful intercourse between nations. This requirement seems
entirely proper, both on principle and policy, if revolutionary activities
and hostile publications by private individuals against foreign states are
to be adequately controlled. It may be entirely relevant to add that though
a cloud of pessimistic gloom has been cast upon laws dealing with hostile
propaganda,98 this fact only emphasizes the urgency and necessity for
their strict application.

IV.

AN OFFENSE AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND

Ironically enough, it is the legislation of the countries of the Soviet
bloc that has emphatically classified private hostile activities against
foreign states within the broader head of war propaganda and, thus, punishable as an offense against the peace and security of mankind. In this
connection, the Peace Defense Act of the Soviet Union enacted on
March 12, 1951, states that "war propaganda, in whatever form conducted, undermines the cause of peace, creates the danger of a new war
and is therefore a grave crime against humanity."99 More specific is the
Czechoslovak Act on the Protection of Peace enacted on December 20,
1950, which provides that "Any person who attempts to disturb the
peaceful communion of nations by inciting in any way whatsoever to
war, by propagating war or otherwise supporting war propaganda, shall
commit a criminal act against peace."' 9 Similarly, the East German Law
on Defense of Peace enacted on December 16, 1950, states that "Whoever slanders other peoples and races, incites against them, and demands
their boycott in order to disturb peaceful relations between them and to
involve the German people in a new war, shall be punished by imprisonment or, in grave cases, by imprisonment at hard labor."''
The Albanian Law on Defense of Peace passed on January 10, 1951, provides
thatWhoever directly or indirectly, orally or by means of the
printed word, radio, or any other media, attempts to provoke
an armed aggression of one state upon another; advocates the
increase of armaments, the use of such weapons of mass destruction as the atom bomb, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and the like; advocates and propagates the doctrine of
98.

MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA 207 (1958)

; and Whitton, Radio Propa-

ganda-A Modest Proposal,52 Am. J. INT'L L. 739, 744-45 (1958).
99. Art. 1. For text, see 46 Am. J.INT'L L. Sump. 34 (1952).
100. § 1, 1 1. For text, id. at 35.
101.

§ 1. For text, id. at 99.
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hatred among nations for the purpose of unleashing a new war;
or commits any other acts aimed at the military and economic
preparation of future aggression and causing in the minds of
the people anxiety and fear of the possibility of a new war,
shall be committing the crime of incitement to war and war
10 2
propaganda.
The Bulgarian Law on Defense of Peace enacted on January 12, 1951,
states that "Instigation to war is commmitted by a person who endeavors
directly or indirectly-by means of press, radio, speech, or other mediato provoke armed aggression by one state against another."''
It must
also be noted that strikingly similar laws have been enacted by Hun0 6
gary,' Poland,' Rumania,"
and the Outer Mongolian Republic.'
The above legislative provisions are very impressive indeed. Their
approach is useful on two grounds. First, such legislation is directed
against private hostile propaganda thus implicitly assuming that the toleration of such activities engages the responsibility of the state. Secondly,
by adopting the broader concept of war propaganda, the legislative provisions here reviewed make it reasonably clear that the interest violated is
not that of the menaced state but, more significantly, an interest of the
World Society in the maintenance of peace. That incitement to commit
aggression against another state is included in the crime of war propaganda can scarcely be denied. But the fact that the assumptions of the
Communist legislation in defense of peace are in principle sound does not
mean that their practical application must therefore be accepted. For the
value of these provisions is partly deceptive both because of the use of
carefully concealed language for the promotion of Communist objectives,' and because of the deep malice of Communist policy towards all
non-Communist States. This latter factor is not lightly to be set aside,
for it is of some significance to observe that the East German law specifically makes allusion to an alleged "aggressive policy of the imperialist
governments of the USA, Great Britain, and France. . . .
In view of the preceding observations and considering the Marxist
social theory that the capitalist world is doomed to perish,"' it follows
logically that the Communist laws in defense of peace are only designed
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

§ 1. For text, id. at 101.
§ 2. For text, id. at 102.
Enacted on December 10, 1950, § 1. For text, id. at 103.
Enacted on December 31, 1950, § 1. For text, id. at 103.
Enacted on December 16, 1950, § 2. For text, id. at 104.
Enacted in 1951, art. 1. For text, id. at 105.
Kulski, Soviet Comments on InternationalLaw, 46 Am. 3. INT'I L. 131 (1952),
See the preamble of the East German Law, note 101 supra.
KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW chs. 1, 3 (1955).
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to protect countries having a Communist ideology, thus implicitly identifying threats to peace with the policy of the capitalist countries."' It is
not at all surprising, therefore, that hostile propaganda against capitalist
countries may be regarded by the Communist governments as merely
hastening the inevitable process of their destruction.1 2
V.

(1)

INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

Under the United Nations Charter

The traditional principle that states are under no obligation to suppress revolutionary activities and hostile publications by private individuals against foreign states breaks down altogether in the presence of
obligations imposed by the United Nations Charter. For the Charter
represents a turning point in efforts to suppress threats to peace coming
from whatever source. It is pertinent to recall in this connection that
the Charter declares in its preamble that the peoples of the United Nations will "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another
as good neighbors.""'
It is of capital importance to add that among the
purposes of the United Nations is the development of "friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace.""' 4 The twin assumptions concerning the
equality of states and the rights of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they wish to live seem to have permeated this
provision." 5 Since these assumptions are basic postulates of universal
peace," 6 it is not easy to see how the legality of a state's passivity in the
presence of private revolutionary activities can be internationally admitted and the existence of a duty to prevent them be so emphatically
denied.
The preceding argument is reflected quite explicitly in Resolution
No. 2 adopted by the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information held at Geneva in March and April of 1948."' The pertinent
part of the Resolution states that the Conference "Condemns solemnly
111. Grzybowski and Pundeff, Soviet Bloc Peace Defense Laws, 46 Am. J. INT'L
L. 537, 539 (1952).
112. Cf. STONE, Legal Controls of International Conflict 59 (1954).
113. U.N. CHARTER, Preamble, para. 5.

114. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
115. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER

OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

COmmENTARY

AND DOCUMENTS 61-62 (1946).
116. These principles are designed to maintain peace and security, which is one of
the purposes of the United Nations.
117. See, Whitton, The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and
the Movement Against InternationalPropaganda,43 Am. J. INT'L L. 73 (1949).
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all propaganda either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and all distortion and falsification of news through whatever channels, private or
governmental, since such activities can only promote misunderstanding
and mistrust between the peoples of the world and thereby endanger lasting peace which the United Nations is consecrated to maintain.""' 8 It is
also to be noted that in almost identical tones some governments expressed the belief that "all governments owe a duty not only to their own
citizens but also to international law to suppress all activities which might
prejudice international peace or law and order ....

""'

Such assertions

resolve themselves into a clear picture of what international law and the
World Society should be if the objectives of the United Nations Charter
are to be attained. And when the argument is thus reduced to an imperative of international life, the conclusion of law that private hostile
activities prejudice international peace becomes, in turn, a demand that
the states be required to suppress them. 2 ' Such a demand then falls
naturally into place alongside the duties inherent in territorial sovereignty.
Viewed in that position, its conclusiveness upon every state becomes
fairly plain.''
If the foregoing observations be correct, the interesting question
arises whether a state's tolerance of revolutionary activities and hostile
propaganda by private individuals is such a threat to the peace of the
world that the matter properly falls within the peace enforcement powers
of the United Nations. 2- Clearly, the Security Council may, as Article
34 of the Charter makes explicit, "investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute,
in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."
This broad phraseology roughly corresponds to Article 11 of the League
of Nations Covenant which in paragraph 2, "declared to be the friendly
right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the
Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the
good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."' 22 Cer118.

U.AN. Conference on Freedom of Information, Final Act, Doc. E/Conf. 6/79,

April 22, 1948, at 23.
119. Cited by Whitton, The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and the Movenent Against International Propaganda,43 Am. J. INT'L L. 73, 77 n.
19 (1949).
120. See on reciprocal aid to suppress crime, DUMAS, op. cit. s upra note 2, at ch. 7.
121. JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 24, at 178.
122. U.N. CHARTER chs. VI, VII.
123. GooDRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 115, at 145-46.
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tainly, under the Charter the Security Council has broad authority to
concern itself with any dispute or situation which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security. A close analysis of
this proposition will immediately reveal that the power of the Security
Council does not come into operation when the dispute or situation has
already endangered international peace or security. The power of the
Security Council is immediately operative upon the existence of a dispute or situation well in advance before it threatens the peace of the
world. But under Article 34 the power of the Security Council is limited
to two functions: (1) to investigate any dispute or situation; and (2) to
determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security. 2" Limited though these powers are,
it nevertheless remains true that these are only preliminary to further
action, and they in reality permit the Security Council to make determinations of fact precedent to the exercise of its peace enforcement
functions.' 25
Against this background, revolutionary activities and hostile propaganda by private individuals against foreign states fall into proper perspective. For in terms of the kind of international peace and security
which the United Nations seeks to achieve, toleration by a state of private
hostile activities against nations with which it is presumably on friendly
terms is probably a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace thus falling unmistakably within the provision of
Article 34 of the United Nations Charter and clearly within the investigatory powers of the Security Council.'26 It may even constitute a
124. The matter may be brought to the attention of the Security Council by any
member of the United Nations, by a state which is not a member, or the Security Council itself may take notice of the dispute or situation. See in this connection, U.N.
CHARTER

125.

arts. 34 and 35.
U.N. CHARTER art. 36.

126. Thus, the Mutual Security Act of 1951, enacted by the United States Congress has been said to be of doubtful character from the standpoint of international law,
for Section 101 (a) of the Act appropriates up to $100,000,000 "for any selected persons
who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries
absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military
forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes, when
it is similarly determined by the President that such assistance will contribute to the
defense of the North Atlantic Area and to the security of the United States." For text,
see Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, 1st Sess. (H.R. 5113) ; 65 Stat. 373-74 (1951). For
a discussion of the questionable character of this provision, see BowETT, SELF-DEFENSE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 46-47 (1958).
For the complaint against the United States by
the Iron Curtain countries, see Official Records of the General Assembly, 6th Session,
First Committee, 472nd to 475th Meetings at 99-121 (1951). Dr. Fenwick also believes
that this Act is violative of Article 2, paragraph (5) of the Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind in that it underttakes and encourages ac-
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danger to justice according to Article 2, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter, which forcibly commands the members of the United Nations to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."2 7 It should be recalled in reference to this latter provision
that Vattel regarded such conduct as a violation of the mutual duty to
promote justice between nations."'
The foregoing analysis is powerfully supported by the experience of
the League of Nations on the subject. For the legal problems involved
were thoroughly explored in the complaint presented on November 22,
1934, by Yugoslavia against Hungary in respect to the assassination of
King Alexander while paying an official visit to France.'2 9 Essentially,
the Yugoslav Government maintained that the assassination of the King
was the result of plots and terrorist activities by Yugoslav refugees in
Hungarian territory. It is highly significant to point out that the Yugoslav complaint was squarely based on Article 11, paragraph 2, of the
Covenant of the League of Nations which has been seen to correspond
substantially to Article 34 of the United Nations Charter. It should be
similarly observed that the complaint did not invoke the first paragraph
of Article 11, which referred to "any war or threat of war.""'
More
specifically, the Yugoslav note asked the League to investigate "this
situation, which seriously compromises relations between Yugoslavia and
Hungary, and which threatens to disturb the peace and good relations between nations.""' It can hardly be denied that such a situation was a
danger to the maintenance of peace, for Czechoslovakia and Rumania
associated themselves with Yugoslavia in almost identical notes, and the
discussion in the Council of the League reached matters involving the
peace settlement of 1919. This turn of events shows remarkably well
that there was a growing conviction among the members of the League
that the issue was not simply one of settling responsibility for the assassination of King Alexander. The more far-reaching question was presented whether a state is obligated by international law to suppress activitivities calculated to foment civil strife in another state. See, Fenwick, Draft Code of
Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Man1kind, 46 Am. J. INT'L L. 98, 99 (1952).
127. Italics supplied.
128. See note 30 sufpra.
129. For a discussion of this case, see Kuhn, supra note 28.
130. Article 11, para. 1 provided: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately
affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared to be a matter
of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case such emergency
should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League
forthwith summon a meeting of the Council."

131. As quoted by Kuhn, supra note 28, at 88.
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ties subversive of the political and social order of a foreign nation. That
the Council answered this question in the affirmative is not seriously
open to doubt, for it unanimously approved a resolution on December 10,
1934, clearly stating that "it is the duty of every State neither to encourage nor tolerate on its territory any terrorist activity with a political
purpose;" and that "every State must do all in its power to prevent and
repress acts of this nature and must for this purpose lend its assistance
to governments which request it.'

13 2

It would appear, therefore, that

the League of Nations regarded the general principle concerning the duty
of a state to protect other states from injurious acts originating within
its jurisdiction, which is historically traceable to the Alabana Claims Arbitration, '3 as being susceptible of wider application. On this view, the
widely applied distinction between organized hostile expeditions which
are condemned by international law and revolutionary acts by individuals
which are not has no defensible basis, for in either case there seems to be
enough ground for liability.
If the experience of the League has any value, the YugoslavHungarian dispute appears to be conclusive upon two points. First, the
action of the League was essentially a recognition that as regards private
revolutionary activities the state has a definite obligation to prevent them.
Secondly, a state's tolerance of such activities engages its international
responsibility amounting to an international delinquency. This conclusion is not only inescapable, but the United Nations cannot safely afford
to ignore it. 3 '

(2) Under International Conventions
It was precisely because of the deep implications of the YugoslavHungarian dispute that the Council of the League set up a committee of
experts with a view to adopting an agreement for the suppression of terrorism. This committee drafted a Convention which was adopted at
Geneva on November 16, 1937."'3 Though this Convention never en132. It should he pointed out that this resolution was based upon Article X of the
Covenant which stated: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case
of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by
which this obligation shall be fulfilled." The corresponding provision of the United
Nations Charter is art. 2, para. 4.
133. United States v. Great Britain (1871). For the record of this arbitration, see
7 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 1059-67.
134. In Resolution 380 (V) of November 17, 1950, the United Nations General Assembly declared that "fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign Power" is aggression. Cited in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 128 (1951).
135. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. For text, see

7

HuDsox, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION

862 (1941).

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

tered into effect, it is believed that a recital of its pertinent provisions
is in order, if only to show the conviction of the states that private terrorist activities ought to be suppressed. Thus, the Convention "reaffirmed the principle of international law in virtue of which it is the
duty of every State to prevent terrorist activities directed against another
State and to prevent the acts in which such activities take shape," and imposed upon each state the obligation "to prevent and punish activities of
this nature and to collaborate for this purpose."' 3 6 In a subsequent
article, the contracting parties agreed to enact legislation punishing "any
incitement to commit" terrorism."'r It is of some significance to add that
under the auspices of the League a Convention was adopted in November,
1 9 3 7 ,13s

creating an International Criminal Court with jurisdiction to

try persons accused of offenses dealt with in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Under the United Nations system, the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, prepared by
the International Law Commission, provides in Article 4 that "Every
State has the duty to refrain from fomenting civil strife in the territory
of another State, and to prevent the organization within its territory of
activities calculated to foment such civil strife."'3 9 Similarly, Article 2,
paragraphs (5) and (6) of the Draft Code of Offenses against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, also adopted by the International Law
Commission, not only prohibits the fomenting of civil strife within the
territory of a state but also the undertaking or encouragement of terrorist activities in another state. 4 Though these offenses may be said to
be committed by the authorities of the state, the International Law Commission itself has acknowledged that criminal responsibility of private individuals under international law may arise under the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article 2, which considers as an offense against the Peace
and Security of Mankind any act which constitutes conspiracy, incitement, attempt or complicity to commit the preceding offenses. 4'
In the field of international propaganda, the Convention Concerning
the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace was adopted at Geneva
on September 23, 1936.142 It is highly interesting that this Convention
imposes upon the contracting parties the obligation "to prohibit and, if
136. Art. 1, para. 1.
137. Art. 3, para. 2.
138. For text of this Convention, see 7 HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 135, at 878.
139. For text, see 44 Am. J. INT'L L. Sup,. 16 (1950).
140. See, Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its
Third Session, 16 May-27 July, 1951; U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth
Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/1858) at 12 (1951).
141. Id. at 13.
142. For text, see 7 HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 135, at 409.
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occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting within their respective territories of any transmission which to the detriment of good
international understanding is of such a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order or the
security of a territory of a High Contracting Party."' 43 It is clear from
this provision that no distinction has been made between governmental
and private propaganda. In the same area, it should be observed that a
number of treaties of peace ending World War II contain a clause imposing upon the defeated nations the obligation to prevent hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union or any one of the United Nations. Thus,
the Peace Treaty with Finland signed in 19474 provides that "Finland,
which in accordance with the Armistice Agreement has taken measures
for dissolving al organizations of a Fascist type on Finnish territory,
whether political, military or para-military, as well as other organizations
conducting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union or to any of the other
United Nations, shall not permit in future the existence and activities of
organizations of that nature which have as their aim denial to the people
of their democratic rights."' 5 Almost identical provisions are found in
the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 4 ' Hungary,'4 7 and Rumania. 8
The foregoing international experience is powerfully reinforced by
a similar experience of the Inter-American system, which has been deeply
preoccupied with the problem both of revolutionary activities and of hostile propaganda. As early as 1889, the South American countries signed
and adopted the Treaty of International Penal Law at Montevideo on
January 23, 1889, which, in dealing with the right of asylum, provided:
"Asylum is inviolable for those under prosecution for political crimes,
but the nation of refuge has the duty to prevent those seeking asylum
from carrying out on its territory acts which put in danger the public
peace of the nation against which they have offended."' 49 Subsequently,
the General Treaty of Peace and Amity signed by the Central American
States at Washington, D. C., on December 20, 1907,' provided that
143. Convention Cotcerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, art. 1.
See also arts. 2, 3, and 4, imposing more specific obligations in the presence of certain
crises.
144. Signed on February 10, 1947. For text, see 42 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 203
(1948).
145. Art. 8.
146. Signed on February 10, 1947. Art. 4. For text, see 42 Am!. J. INT'L L.
Sup'. 179 (1948).
147. Signed on February 10, 1947. Art. 4. For text, see 42 Am!. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 225 (1948).
148. Signed on February 10, 1947. Art. 5. For text, see 42 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 252 (1948).
149. Art. 16. For text, see note 95 at 260.
150. For text, see 2 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 219 (1908).
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"Every person, no matter what his nationality, who, within the territory
of one of the contracting Parties, shall initiate or foster revolutionary
movements against any of the others, shall be immediately brought to the
capital of the Republic, where he shall be submitted to trial according to
law."''
It is of some interest to observe that this particular provision
came before the Central American Court of Justice in 1908 when Honduras accused Guatemala and El Salvador of unneutral conduct in that
refugees in the latter countries were permitted to foment revolution
against Honduras.'
After issuing an interlocutory decree in which the
court ordered Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua not to assist revolutionary movements within their territory and to confine to one place the
political refugees from Honduras, final judgment was rendered on December 19, 1908, absolving the defendant governments of the charges
brought against them."' The court seemed to have proceeded upon the
theory that diplomatic negotiations between the parties had not been exhausted and that Honduras failed to maintain the burden of proof in
respect to its allegations.
It is, however, in the area of hostile propaganda where more positive
results seem to have been reached. Thus, the South American Regional
Agreement on Radio Communications signed at Buenos Aires on April
10, 1935,1"4 obliges the contracting parties to avoid broadcasts containing offensive or defamatory words or ideas against other signatory countries as well as "all kinds of transmissions which have an obvious tendency to jeopardize good international relations."' 5 5 Subsequently, the
Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos
Aires in 1936 approved several resolutions urging the American Republics to adhere to the Geneva Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace of 1936,"56 and to avoid broadcasting likely
to disturb the peaceful relations between the signatories.'
It may be
added that the Charter of the Organization of American States adopted
in BogotA in 1948 has a specific provision prohibiting the intervention of
one state in the internal affairs of another."' 8 It is submitted, however,
151.
152.

Art. 17.
See 2 Am. J. INT'L L. 835 (1908).

153. See 3 Aut. J. INT'L L. 434 (1909).
154. For text, see 7 HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 135, at 47.
155. Art. 7, § 2.
156. For text of this Convention, see note 142 supra.
157. Cited by Whitton, Radio Propaganda-A Modest Proposal,52 A-.

J. INT'L

L.

739 (1958).
158. This is article 15 which says: "No State or group of States has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but
also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the
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that though this provision may be broad enough to include hostile propaganda,'59 it is addressed to governmental action and not to activities of
private individuals. Of perhaps more significance is the resolution
adopted at BogotA in 1948 in which the American Republics agreed to
adopt measures against any kind of activities originating from abroad
and designed to overthrow their political institutions, to foment internal
disorder or to disturb "by means of pressure, subversive propaganda,
threats or by any other means," the right of their peoples to govern themselves. 6 ' It may be significantly noted that in 1953 the Inter-American
Council of Jurists adopted a Draft Convention on the Regime of Political Exiles, Asylees and Refugees, in which the pertinent provision stated:
Freedom of expression of thought and of speech, granted
by domestic law to all inhabitants of a State, may not be ground
for complaint by a third State on the pretext of opinions expressed publicly against it or its government by political exiles,
asylees, or refugees, except when they constitute propaganda
tending to incite to the use of force or violence against the complaining State.'
As an added measure of protection, a number of states have entered
into bilateral treaties binding themselves to suppress both revolutionary
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements." For text, see 46 AMi. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 43, 46 (1952).
159. THOMAS & THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 27, at 292.
160. As quoted by Whitton, Radio Propaganda-A Modest Proposal, 52 Ali. 3.
INT'L L. 739, 743 (1958).
161. Article 6. Italics supplied. For text, see 5 ANNALS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES 166 (1953). It is to be observed that two important cases have come

before the Council of the Organization of American States which may throw some light
upon this problem. One case was that of Costa Rica against Nicaragua, in which Costa
Rica charged Nicaragua with invading its territory. The investigation ordered by the
Council showed that both governments were negligent for not having taken adequate
measures to prevent the development in their respective territories of movements tending
to overthrow each other's government. For a discussion of this case, see Garcia-Mora,
The Law of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 20 FORDHAm L. Rxv. 1,
15-22 (1951). The other case was that of Haiti against the Dominican Republic, in
which the Government of Haiti claimed that it was the victim of "moral aggression" in
that a former colonel of the Haitian Army, having taken refuge in Santo Domingo (today Ciudad Trujillo), was engaged in the latter state in plots to overthrow the Haitian
Government. After the matter had been submitted to the Council, the two states settled
it amicably agreeing not to "tolerate in their respecive territories the activities of any
individuals, groups, or parties, national or foreign, that have as their object the disturbance of the domestic peace of either of the two neighboring Republics or of any
other friendly Nation." 1 ANNALS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 326; see

also id. at 217-19, 325-26 (1949). The significant point about these cases is that private
subversive activities and propaganda in another state may constitute, according to the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, an aggression which is not an armed attack, thus falling within the provision of Article 6 of
the Treaty. For text of this Treaty, see 42 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 53 (1949).
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designs and hostile propaganda proceeding from each other's territory.
One of the earliest treaties of this kind was the Treaty of Paris of October 8, 1801,"02 signed between France and Russia, which provided:
The two Contracting Parties . . . engage not to suffer

their respective subjects to maintain any correspondence, direct
or indirect, with the enemies of the present government of the
two States, or to propagate principles contrary to their respective constitutions, or to foment disturbances, and that in consequence of this Agreement, every subject of one of those
Powers inhabiting the States of the other, who shall do anything to its safety, shall be removed from the said country and
transported beyond its frontiers without having any claim to
the protection of its own government.'63
In the inter-war period, the Soviet Union concluded a series of bilateral agreements with a number of states designed to suppress revolutionary activities against the Soviet Government abroad as well as to
afford a similar protection to other governments in respect to revolutionary acts originating in Soviet territory. Thus, in the peace Treaty
between the Soviet Union and Esthonia signed on February 2, 1920,164
both parties agreed "to prohibit the creation and presence in their territories of organizations and groups which claim to be the government of
the territory, or a part of the territory of the other contracting party, or
of representations and officials of such groups and organizations as aim
at the overthrow of the government of the other contracting party."'' In
the same category must be included the short-lived Roosevelt-Litvinov
Agreement of November 16, 1933,166 in which the Soviet Government

undertookNot to permit the formation or residence on its territory
of any organization or group-and to prevent the activity on
its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group--which has as
an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of,
or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or
social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its
territories or possessions. 6 '
162.

As cited by Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 120.

163.
164.
165.
166.

Art. III.

167.

Para. 4.

As cited by Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 120.

Art. VII.
For text, see 1 HACKWORTH,

op. cit. supra note 18, at 305.
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. In simila- vein, the Tangiers Agreement -of 1929 signed between
France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain 68 is of singular interest in that it
provides that "any agitation, propaganda or conspiracy against the established order in any of the Zones of Morocco or in any foreign country is
prohibited."' 0 Finally, it seems' that since the end of World War II only
one bilateral treaty has been entered into, namely, the Treaty of 1948 between India and Pakistan, in which the parties mutually promised toensure that their respective organizations handling publicity, including publicity through radio and the film, refrain from
and control: (a) propaganda against the other Dominion, and
(b) publication of exaggerated versions of news of a character
likely to inflame, or cause fear or alarm to, the population, or
any section of the population in either Dominion.'
These persuasive recitals would seem to be conclusive as to the obligation of a state to prevent revolutionary activities and hostile propaganda
by private individuals against foreign states. In default of such a duty,
the state has incurred an international responsibility. It is therefore concluded that the view that international law is not violated by private hostile actions against foreign governments may well have become an archaic
hangover not at all consonant with international morality and must probIt may be said to be a principle emergably be regarded as unsound.'
ing from the international conventions here reviewed that a state's tolerance of private revolutionary activities and hostile propaganda against
foreign nations is not only illegal under modern international law but it
is also a disservice to the cause of international peace and security.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The body of international and domestic law above discussed would
seem to establish beyond any reasonable doubt the existence of a duty to
prevent the use of a state's territory for hostile private actions designed
to change the political or social order of foreign states. While this proposition seems unquestioned, the argument may be advanced that such a
duty exists among the states only on the basis of a treaty. On this view,
it is readily concluded that even the multilateral conventions here reviewed seem to be based on the assumption that no such duty exists
168.

For text, see 23 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 238 (1929).

169. Art. 10.
170. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 1/105 at 29, and quoted in Whitton, Radio Propaganda-A Modest Proposal,52 Am. J.INT'L L. 739, 741 (1958).
171. Cf. Paoli, Contribution a l'etude des Crinmes de Guerre et des Crimnes contre
L'Humanitj en; Droit Penal International, 39 REvuE GtNtRRA DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 129, 146 (France 1941-45).
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apart from treaty." 2 The validity of this argument is, however, highly
deceptive, for this branch of the law is only a phase of the general duty
of a state to prevent the commission within its jurisdiction of injurious
acts against friendly foreign countries. This duty of prevention is a
prescription resulting from the exercise of territorial sovereignty and
unmistakably falling within the competence of general international law.
It is therefore submitted that the inclusioh of this duty in a number of
conventions is a recognition on the part of the states of the existence of
a rule of general international law, whose validity in terms of substantial
justice and policy can scarcely be denied.
172. This matter is brought out by Professor Stone as regards hostile propaganda
on the part of the government, but it is believed that the same observations are applicable
to private propaganda. See STONE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 319.
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